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NOTES
in the Gambino case the Supreme Court either has repudiated
the limitations set down in the Weeks and Byars cases and the
basic conception underlying Twining v. New Jersey and cases
of like tenor, or has established a shaky foundation for deter-
mining the admissibility of evidence by making the instant deci-
sion turn on a distinction without meaning-the fact, namely,
that the State enforcement act had been repealed.
ABRAHAM E. MARGOLIN, '29.
ADJUDICATION OF PARTNERSHIP AS BANKRUPT UN-
DER VOLUNTARY PETITION IRRESPECTIVE OF
THE ADJUDICATION OF THE PARTNERS
The question of whether the adjudication of a partnership as
bankrupt necessarily adjudicates the members composing the
firm as bankrupts is one which has troubled the Federal courts
ever since they have been granted jurisdiction in bankruptcy,
with the result that there are two distinct lines of Federal cases.
Not until the recent decision of Liberty National Bank v. Bear'
did the Supreme Court of the United States definitely decide the
point, holding that the adjudication of the firm did not of itself
amount to an adjudication of the individual partners as bank-
rupt.
The question has always been a knotty one and its decision has
always hinged on whether the court recognized the partnership
as an entity or not. The very question of the entity of a part-
nership has troubled the common law courts ever since the idea
of partnership associations was conceived. Newman v. Eld-
ridge2 gives us the holding of the law merchant and the civil
law that a partnership is considered a legal entity distinct from
the individuals composing it. However, the common law for the
most part has recognized this entity,3 and for nearly all practical
purposes a partnership in the eyes of the common law is not an
entity, but merely a group of individuals.
In equity the situation is somewhat different and as illus-
trated by Farney v. Hauser et al.,4 the entity of a partnership
will be recognized for some purposes. Thus, in the marshalling
'(1928), 48 S. Ct. 252.
(1901), 107 La. 315, 31 So. 688.Flexner v. Farson, (1918), 248 U. S. 289, 63 L. Ed. 250, 39 S. Ct. 97;
In re Peck (1912), 206 N. Y. 55, 99 N. E. 258; Cutting v. Daigulau (1890),
151 Mass. 297, 23 N. E. 839; E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Jones
Bros. et al. (1912), 200 F. 638.
' (1921), 109 Kan. 75, 198 P. 178.
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of assets, which is purely of an equitable nature, the entity of a
partnership is recognized to this extent, viz.: When a firm is in
equity for an accounting, or for winding up proceedings, the
firm creditors have priority to the firm assets only, and the in-
dividual creditors have priority to the individual assets. If
there is any surplus after paying the respective debts, the two
sets of creditors share pro rata. This is the rule of the Uniform
Partnership Act as well as of the weight of authority of case
lawA
However, it is with respect to cases arising under the Bank-
ruptcy Statutes of the United States that there arises greatest
confusion in regard to the nature of a partnership, and decisions
have swung as a pendulum, first holding one way and then an-
other. The Constitution gives Congress power to regulate bank-
ruptcy, which Congress exercised in passing a Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act.6 The task is to determine whether a partnership as
construed by this act is or is not an entity. Section 5 of the Act
deals with partnerships. In re Bertenshaw,8 in construing por-
tions of Section 5, holds that a partnership is a distinct entity,
a legal person separate from the partners who compose it. It
owns its property and owes its debts apart from individual prop-
erty of its members which it does not own and apart from indi-
vidual debts which it does not owe. It may be adjudged bank-
rupt although the partners who compose it are not so adjudged.
Many other cases follow this line of authority.9
A leading case tending in the other direction is Francis v.
McNeal." In this case creditors filed a petition against three
persons doing business as the Provident Investment Bureau, a
partnership, alleging that the partners were bankrupt individ-
ually as well as the firm. The firm was adjudicated bankrupt
in June, 1909; one McNeal was appointed trustee and filed a pe-
tition to order the partners to turn over their individual assets
to him. Francis, one of the partners, objected on the ground
that he never had been individually adjudged a bankrupt. The
court, however, upheld the contention of the trustee, basing its
decision upon the idea that despite the possible fact that the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Act seems to impose the idea of an entity upon
a partnership, the common law liability of the partners, never-
theless, was not intended to be cut off. Hence the individual
property of the partners was ordered to be turned over to the
'U. P. A. Section 40h; Rodgers v. Meranda (1857), 7 Ohio St. 179.
'11 U. S. C. A. 11h.
S11 U. S. C. A. 23.
(1907), 157 F. 363.
'In re Meyer (1899), 98 F. 976; In re Mercer (1903), 102 F. 384; Mills
v. Fisher (1908), 159 F. 897.
(1913), 228 U. S. 695, 33 S. Ct. 701, 57 L. Ed. 1029, L. R. A. 1915E, 706.
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trustee in bankruptcy of the firm. Obviously, the court here
came very near to deciding that the adjudication in bankruptcy
of a firm ipso facto adjudicated the partners individually.
In Liberty National Bank v. Bear, supra, W. L. Becker and
W. L. Becker, Jr., were partners doing business as W. L. Becker
and Co. On August 20, a writ was granted adjudging the firm
bankrupt. Prior to that, on July 31 of the same year, the plain-
tiff bank had recovered a judgment against the firm and the in-
dividuals and acquired its lien in the usual method against the
separate property of the individuals. They filed their claim
with the trustee of the partnership assets (who nine months
later also became trustee of the individual assets), and he re-
fused the claim on the ground that the partners individually
were adjudged bankrupt by the firm's having been adjudged
bankrupt, and that the lien was nullified since it was acquired
within four months of the adjudication in bankruptcy. The Dis-
trict Court reversed the decision of the referee, who had found
for the trustee, on the ground that the adjudication of the firm
did not of itself adjudicate the partners and rendered judgment
for the bank. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Dis-
trict Court, adopting the holding of the referee and the line of
decisions on which he relied. The Supreme Court in the first
hearing", straddled the issue without deciding the critical point
and sent the case back to be retried on a different theory. The
Circuit Court of Appeals again found for the referee and the
plaintiff again brought the case to the Supreme Court on a writ
of certiorari. This time the Court came directly to the point,
holding that the adjudication in bankruptcy of a partnership did
not of itself adjudicate the individual partners as bankrupts;
hence the bank's lien was upheld as having been acquired more
than four months before the bankruptcy adjudication of the
partners.
The Court in reaching its decision was faced with the old prob-
lem, namely, "Is a partnership a legal entity?" The Bank-
ruptcy Act seems to favor the entity theory. The court points
out the difference between the old Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and
the present one. The law of 1867 did not permit the partner-
ship entity to become bankrupt, but merely provided that when
two or more persons who were partners in business were ad-
judged bankrupt the property of the partnership as well as that
of the partners should be taken over by the court for adminis-
' (1928), 72 L. Ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 49, in which the court reversed the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals on the ground that there was no pleading nor proof
as to the insolvency of the Beckers when the plaintiff bank recovered its
judgment and that there was no ground under 67C or 67F of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 565, for annulling the lien.
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tration.12 The present act not only omits this provision of the
former law, but after providing generally that the word "per-
sons" when used in the act shall include "partnerships" 13 and
that a petition in bankruptcy may be filed against a person who
is insolvent and has committed an act of bankruptcy, declares in
Section 5a, supra, that a partnership during the continuation of
the partnership business or after its dissolution and before final
settlement thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt. The inference
here is clear that a partnership as An entity may be adjudged
bankrupt; but it is doubtful that Congress intended to impart
this idea, which necessarily would carry with it some very pe-
culiar results.
The court then cites Francis v. McNeal, supra, and reconciles
it with the case at hand on the ground that the court in the for-
mer did not decide the point in question, but another one entire-
ly. A close examination of the case, however, will show that the
court came near to deciding the case contra to the holding at
hand. We now have these holdings which, while not contra to
each other, give rise to the further question, may the two cases
exist logically together? A partner individually is liable for the
debts of the firm in law as well as in equity. This proposition is
too well settled to require citation. This liability is one of the
"assets" which firm creditors are entitled to reach, whether the
firm is considered an entity or not, as for example, in states rec-
ognizing the entity of partnerships, the individual liability of
the partners remains intact and unchanged. Therefore, as be-
tween a partner and a firm creditor, his individual liability may
be regarded as quasi firm property, and accordingly when the
firm is adjudged bankrupt, the court has the power to order it
to turn over its assets which include the individual liability of
each partner. Hence under this argument and under Francis
v. McNeal, the court may order the partners of a firm which has
been adjudged bankrupt to turn over their separate assets even
though they as individuals have not been adjudged bankrupt.
Congress in the Bankruptcy Act, as interpreted by Bank v.
Bear, is taken to say that a firm may be adjudged bankrupt
apart from the individuals composing it. Does this mean that
Congress intended that the individual liability of the partners,
so carefully guarded at common law and equity, is to be removed
in bankruptcy proceedings? To adopt such an interpretation
would result in making a firm creditor file his claim with the
trustee of the partnership, get his satisfaction, and then sue the
individuals for the deficiency. This would be imposing a burden
upon him, which neither law nor equity ever has imposed.
=14 Stat. 517.
111 U. S. C. A. 1.
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Therefore, it seems hardly probably that Congress intended to
establish such a result.
The Bankruptcy Act must be interpreted in the light of both
Francis v. McNeal and Bank v. Bear, that is, that a partnership
may be adjudged bankrupt as an entity, but nevertheless, the
court may order the non-bankrupt individual partners to turn
over their assets to make up for any deficiency which may hap-
pen to exist.
Hence, Francis v. McNeal and Bank v. Bear, must exist side
by side for a logical interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act, the
former to prevent the peculiar result mentioned above, and the
latter to allow the bankruptcy of a firm without necessarily
purging partners of their debts by also adjudging them bank-
rupts.
We now have a situation in which a firm may be adjudged
bankrupt irrespective of the adjudication of the partners, with
the court having power to order such non-bankrupt partners
to turn over their separate assets to the trustee of the firm prop-
erty. Along with the rule of these two cases we have Section
5f of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides in substance that the
firm creditors shall have priority only to firm assets and that
individual creditors shall have priority to individual assets, and
that any surplus remaining in either fund shall be divided pro
rata between the two sets of creditors.
Keeping these three rules in mind, let us apply them to a
hypothetical case which may arise and probably has arisen many
times. A and B are partners doing business as A B & Co., a
partnership, the firm is insolvent and is adjudged a bankrupt
irrespective of the partners under Bank v. Bear. The court
relying on Francis v. McNeal, orders the non-bankrupt partners
to turn over their individnal property to the trustee of the firm
property. A and B are both insolvent as to firm and individual
debts, but both have enough property to pay their individual
creditors. Now must the separate creditors of A and B stand
by and see the property, to which Section 5f gives them priority,
go to the trustee of the firm property, and perhaps become ex-
hausted so as not to be sufficient to cover the individual debts?
This situation seems to render the two cases repugnant to Sec-
tion 5f, but let us see.
The law does not aid persons who sleep on their rights. Hence
if the separate creditors of A and B are not awake to the situa-
tion, the separate assets will be turned over to the trustee of the
firm and paid to firm creditors. Of course this may work a
hardship and an injustice on separate creditors who are away
from home or who are otherwise unable to act in the matter.
But the same is true in any situation where two creditors seek
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
payment from the same fund; the more alert will be successful.
Section 5f presupposes that all the parties have been adjudged
bankrupt, in which situation the rule of marshalling of assets
is applied. Therefore where a firm is adjudged bankrupt irre-
spective of the individual partners, whether Section 5f, which
clearly is favorable to them is to apply, depends on the vigilance
of creditors of the individual partners who likewise have been
adjudged bankrupt.
For a clearer understanding of the above, which at most is a
mere forecast as to what the Supreme Court will hold when the
issue arises, it must be remembered that before a person may
be adjudged bankrupt, he must be proved insolvent. Although
the entity of a partnership in bankruptcy had been recognized
by the weight of authority prior to the decision of Bank V. Bear,
nevertheless, it was held, that before a firm could be proved in-
solvent, the individual property of the partners plus the prop-
erty of the firm had to be insufficient to pay firm debts, and a
firm was never held to be bankrupt, as long as one of the mem-
bers was solvent. But to this holding there was a real objection
on the ground that the firm was an entity, and hence the separate
property of the partners could not be taken into cognizance.24
This objection may gain recognition in the light of Bank v. Bear,
which finally settled the question of the partnership as an entity
in bankruptcy. If it does gain recognition, the intricate ques-
tion of the administration of the separate assets of the non-
bankrupt, solvent partner, will arise. But this is anticipating
too far and has no place in this article.
The long period of oscillating decisions is over and the Su-
preme Court has decided once and for all that a partnership is
an entity in bankruptcy, which may be adjudicated a bankrupt
irrespective of the partners composing it. This decision is in
harmony with the earlier leading case of Francis v. MeNeal, and
both cases are in perfect harmony with Section 5f of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, in the light of its present interpretation.
STANLEY WEISS, '29.
THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSIENT NONRESIDENT
MOTORIST
A question of increasing importance, especially in this age of
almost universal use of the automobile, recently has been pre-
sented to the courts. It is as follows: May a state subject to
14Collier on Bankruptcy 12th Ed. p. 172 and cases thereunder; Reming-
ton 2nd Ed., Section 1348.
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